Through communication, we form beliefs about the world, its history, others and ourselves. A vast proportion of these beliefs we count as knowledge. We seem to possess this knowledge only because it has been communicated. If those justifications that depended on communication were outlawed, all that would remain would be body of illsupported prejudice. The recognition of our ineradicable dependence on testimony for much of what we take ourselves to know has suggested to many that an epistemological account of testimony should be essentially similar to accounts of perception and memory. This premise I want to dispute.
The recognition of this distinguishing feature of testimony is reflected in our tendency to be sceptical of testimony. Our psychological attitude towards what we seem to perceive or remember is one of acceptance. Our psychological attitude towards what another tells us is to accept what we are told only given the presence of further background belief.
These beliefs may relate to the testimony as a type. We distinguish types of content and types of speaker -an individual speaker can be thought of as a particularly narrowly defined type. These beliefs allow us to support acceptance with the judgement that the testimony is credible. On many occasions our acceptance is also supported by a judgement that the particular content expressed is true. Our psychological disposition is to accept testimony only given suitable supporting background beliefs about the testimony's credibility and truth.
Given that a speaker's intentions in communicating need not be informative and given the relevance of these intentions to the acquisition of testimonial knowledge, I take this psychological disposition to be rational. It is doxastically irresponsible to accept testimony without some background belief in the testimony's credibility or truth. In the case of perception and memory rational acceptance only requires the absence of defeating background beliefs. In the case of testimony, rational acceptance requires the presence of supporting background beliefs.
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This demand of responsibility may be expressed as a criterion of justification.
An audience is justified in forming a testimonial belief if and only if he is justified in
accepting the speaker's testimony. Call this the principle of assent. The "justified" should
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Assent and Acceptance
In this section I want to argue that the principle of assent is compatible with the Acceptance Principle and consistent with its justification. I take the Acceptance Principle first.
The following distinction may be drawn. A justification connects an episode of believing with the truth of the proposition believed: it should state for what reasons a belief is held and it should determine that the proposition believed is, at least, likely to be true. These two aspects are conceptually separable: one may discriminate between the justification of a belief and the justification of a proposition. Thus the distinction I should like to draw is between the justification supporting the proposition expressed by the speaker's testimony and the justification supporting the audience's acceptance of this proposition.
The Acceptance Principle draws an epistemic consequence from the following presumption. One may presume that (seemingly) intelligible testimony is true because one may presume that it is justified. (Read "testimony" as "presentation-as-true".) This distinction between the justification of a belief and the justification of a proposition allows the following interpretation of this presumption. If a given testimony is justified, this justification epistemically supports the proposition the testimony expresses. If an
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To interpret the Acceptance Principle is this manner is to pursue an analogy suggested 
